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 1 Bartlett v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 2:13-CV-0170 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 8, 
2015). See Bartlett Verdict and Settlement Summary, JVR No. 1601150042, 2015 WL 
9841769, for a selection of court filings from the case. 
16 BARTLETT v. E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO. [2016 
I. THE PROBLEM OF COMPLEX SCIENTIFIC QUESTIONS IN LITIGATION 
Complex scientific questions are commonplace in modern litigation. 
Questions about drug interactions, patent applicability, and environmental 
consequences are routinely presented to judges and juries who often lack the 
technical background to untangle the complex legal and factual questions 
therein. Courts and other quasi-judicial bodies have been exploring alternative 
methods of adjudicating scientific questions, giving rise to a number of 
questions about the efficacy and legitimacy of these efforts.2 One such 
alternative method of alternative scientific adjudication took place recently in 
Bartlett v. DuPont in the Southern District of Ohio.3 Mrs. Carla Bartlett brought 
suit against E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (DuPont) for its role in 
leaking a cancer-causing chemical known as “C8”4 into Mrs. Bartlett’s drinking 
water, causing her to develop kidney cancer.5 On October 7, 2015, a Columbus 
jury found DuPont liable for causing Mrs. Bartlett’s cancer.6 The first of 3,500 
C8 personal injury suits against DuPont for its role in C8 leakage, the jury 
awarded Mrs. Bartlett $1.6 million in compensatory damages.7 
                                                                                                                     
 2 See NANCY GERTNER & JUDITH H. MIZNER, THE LAW OF JURIES 12 (4th ed. 2010) 
(discussing failed “complexity exceptions” to the general right to a jury trial in federal civil 
cases). For example, as a result of the BP Gulf Oil Spill in 2010, a federal court in Louisiana 
employed a segmented litigation strategy to deal with the excessively complicated scientific 
and statutory questions before the court. ELI’s Gulf Team, Deepwater Horizon Litigation: 
Where Things Stand and What Is Next, ENVTL. L. INST. (Jan. 14, 2014), http://eli-
ocean.org/gulf/cwalitigation/ [http://perma.cc/5K5W-MXM9]. 
 3 Bartlett, No. 2:13-CV-0170. Bartlett is part of the larger multidistrict litigation 
(MDL), the C8 Personal Injury Litigation, centered in the Southern District of Ohio pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. C-8 Pers. Injury Litig., No. 2:13-
MD-2433 (S.D. Ohio filed Apr. 9, 2013); 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012) (“When civil actions 
involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in different districts, such 
actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial 
proceedings.”); see also Multidistrict Litigation 2433: In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours and 
Company, U.S. DISTRICT CT. SOUTHERN DISTRICT OHIO, 
http://www.ohsd.uscourts.gov/multidistrict-litigation-2433 [http:// perma.cc/W399-Y8DP]. 
 4 Sources differ as to “C-8” and “C8.” See, e.g., infra notes 6–8. This Comment uses 
“C8” except where quoted sources use “C-8.” 
 5 Complaint for Money Damages, Bartlett, No. 2:13-CV-0170, ECF No. 1, 2013 WL 
11075812 [hereinafter Bartlett Complaint]; see also Kevin Williams, In Ohio’s ‘Chemical 
Valley,’ a Debate Over Good Jobs and Bad Health, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-ohios-chemical-valley-a-debate-over-good-jobs-
and-bad-health/2015/12/12/3341b626-8fab-11e5-baf4-bdf37355da0c_story.html [https://perma.cc/ 
E8SG-6WC8]. 
 6 Jury Verdict Form, Bartlett, No. 2:13-CV-0170, ECF No. 142, 2015 WL 7075752; 
see also Earl Rinehart, DuPont Negligent in C8 Case, Owes Woman $1.6 Million, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2015/10/07/ 
Dupont-ordered-to-pay-damages.html [http://perma.cc/8XP2-AJNR]. 
 7 Jury Verdict Form, supra note 6; Rinehart, supra note 6. The jury award consisted of 
$1.1 million for DuPont’s negligence in causing Mrs. Bartlett’s cancer and $500,000 for her 
emotional distress. Jury Verdict Form, supra note 6, at 1–3; see also Jury Awards Woman 
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In Bartlett, parties employed a C8 Science Panel in order to conclusively 
determine whether C8—which was released by DuPont into Southern Ohio and 
West Virginia drinking water—was capable of causing certain diseases.8 The 
C8 Science Panel in Bartlett provides an example of efforts to develop effective 
ways of adjudicating cases that involve complex scientific questions and further 
provides an excellent vehicle for exploring whether emerging techniques help 
or hamper a normative understanding of the role juries play in preserving trial 
“fairness.”9 
Part II of this Comment will provide a brief overview of the facts of Bartlett 
and the creation and execution of the C8 Science Panel used in the C8 personal 
injury litigation. Part III will outline a normative framework of the “fairness” 
embodied by a traditional jury in order to evaluate Bartlett’s efficacy in 
preserving fairness through use of the C8 Science Panel. Part IV will evaluate 
how the C8 Science Panel performs in light of this normative framework. Part 
V will look toward the future of alternative scientific adjudication in light of this 
normative framework, due process, and considerations of public policy. 
II. THE CREATION OF THE C8 SCIENCE PANEL  
AND ITS ROLE IN BARTLETT 
Since the 1950s, DuPont’s Teflon plant near Parkersburg, West Virginia 
had been releasing perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) or ammonium 
perfluorooctanoate (APFO), also known as “C8,” into the surrounding drinking 
water.10 The C8 contaminated area included six water districts on the Ohio and 
West Virginia border affecting the area known as Tupper’s Plains and parts of 
fourteen Ohio and West Virginia counties.11 In 2001, a group of plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                     
$1.6M in First C8 Lawsuit Against DuPont, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Oct. 7, 2015), 
http://www.wvgazettemail.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20151007/GZ01/151009617/11
23 [https://perma.cc/7D37-Y9VB] [hereinafter Jury Awards $1.6M]. The jury, however, did 
not find that DuPont acted with “actual malice” warranting compensatory damages. Jury 
Verdict Form, supra note 6, at 4; Rinehart, supra note 6. 
 8 See infra notes 12–17 and accompanying text; see also Nathaniel Rich,  
The Lawyer Who Became DuPont’s Worst Nightmare, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/magazine/the-lawyer-who-became-duponts-worst-
nightmare.html [https://perma.cc/7A2B-DVMG]. 
 9 See infra Parts III–IV. 
 10 The Science Panel Website Home, C8 SCI. PANEL, http://www.c8sciencepanel.org 
[https://perma.cc/V72X-82DD] (last updated Nov. 28, 2013); Multidistrict Litigation 2433, 
supra note 3; see also Jury Awards $1.6M, supra note 7; Matthew Kelly, Contamination 
Puts Wetland at Risk, NEWCASTLE HERALD (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.theherald.com.au/ 
story/2734628/contamination-puts-wetland-at-risk/ [https://perma.cc/2JFX-VSYB]; Bartlett 
Complaint, supra note 5, at para. 16. The release of C8 and other chemicals is associated 
with the production of non-stick products, such as Teflon. See Jury Awards $1.6M, supra 
note 7; Kelly, supra. 
 11 Veronica M. Vieira et al., Perfluorooctanoic Acid Exposure and Cancer Outcomes 
in a Contaminated Community: A Geographic Analysis, 121 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 318, 
319 (2013). 
18 BARTLETT v. E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO. [2016 
brought suit in West Virginia against DuPont under a variety of tort actions, all 
based on a theory of drinking water contamination.12 This group was granted 
class certification (Leach Class) and the suit against DuPont reached a 
settlement agreement (Leach Settlement) in November 2004.13 The Leach 
Settlement created a C8 “Science Panel” to conduct a “Community Study” of 
the C8 affected area.14 The Panel was created by mutual agreement and its 
purpose was to conclusively determine whether there was a “Probable Link” or 
“No Probable Link” between the ingestion of C8 and various human diseases.15 
A finding of “Probable Link” by the Panel would indicate that it was “more 
likely than not” that there was a link between ingestion of C8 at a particular 
contamination level and a human disease.16 For any linked disease, individual 
members of the Leach Class would be able to pursue claims “for personal injury 
and wrongful death” as well as “any claims for injunctive relief and special, 
general and punitive and any other damages.”17 DuPont, however, reserved the 
right to contest specific causation, damages, and assert any other defense not 
barred by the Leach Settlement.18 Conversely, where the C8 Science Panel 
found “No Probable Link” between C8 and a particular disease, those persons 
would be forever barred from suit.19 
The Leach Settlement also determined composition of the C8 Science 
Panel.20 In the Leach Settlement parties were required to “mutually agree upon” 
three “independent, appropriately credentialed epidemiologists” to form the C8 
Science Panel.21 In order to confirm a “Probable Link,” at least two panelists 
had to agree that it was “more likely than not” that C8 consumption could cause 
                                                                                                                     
 12 Amended Class Action Complaint, Leach v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 
01-C-698 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 30, 2001) (attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. C-8 Pers. Injury Litig., 
No. 2:13-MD-2433 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 3, 2014), ECF No. 820 [hereinafter MDL Plaintiff’s 
MSJ], ECF No. 820-5); see also Rich, supra note 8. 
 13 Order Approving Final Settlement and Notice Plan and for Entry of Final Judgment 
at 1–2, Leach, No. 01-C-698 (Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Leach Order] (attached as Exhibit 
E to MDL Plaintiff’s MSJ, ECF No. 820-9); Class Action Settlement Agreement, Exhibit 1 
to Leach Order [hereinafter Leach Settlement] (attached as Exhibit D to MDL Plaintiff’s 
MSJ, ECF No. 820-8). 
 14 Leach Settlement, supra note 13, §§ 1.12, 12.2. 
 15 Id. §§ 12.2.2, 12.2.3(b) (“The Science Panel shall develop and approve . . . a protocol 
for a study of Human Disease among residents exposed to C-8 . . . [and] evaluate the 
available scientific evidence to determine . . . whether such evidence demonstrates a 
Probable Link between C-8 exposure and any Human Disease.”).  
 16 Id. § 1.49 (defining “Probable Link”); id. § 12.2.3(b). 
 17 Id. §§ 3.2–.3.  
 18 Id. § 3.3.  
 19 Id. § 1.42 (defining “No Probable Link Finding”); id. § 3.3.  
 20 Leach Settlement, supra note 13, § 12.2.1; Kathy Lynn Gray, Thousands of C8 Suits 
Against DuPont Flood Federal Court, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Sept. 8, 2014), 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/ 
local/2014/09/08/thousands-of-c8-suits-flood-court.html [http://perma.cc/65R2-A544].  
 21 Leach Settlement, supra note 13, § 12.2.1.  
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a particular disease.22 Eventually, the parties agreed upon Dr. Fletcher of the 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Dr. Savits of Brown 
University, and Dr. Steenland of Emory University.23 These scientists were 
chosen for their “long experience in designing and carrying out environmental 
health studies” and the parties’ belief that they would be able to “objectively 
generate and evaluate the evidence.”24 
Importantly, DuPont wholly paid for the C8 Science Panel.25 In total, 
DuPont spent over $30 million to fund the Panel’s study.26 Despite its  
funding source, the Panel purported to be a totally neutral investigation team 
with no predispositions: “We came to this project as independent 
epidemiologists . . . and remained independent and neutral throughout. . . . We 
had no belief ahead of time that C8 does or doesn't affect human health.”27 With 
this promise of neutrality, the community study went forward under the Panel’s 
direction between 2005 and 2013.28 
Procedurally, in order to determine whether a link existed, the Panel 
conducted a holistic and in-depth study of the C8 affected area.29 The panel 
drew blood, conducted questionnaires, and assessed the medical histories of 
approximately 69,000 Mid-Ohio Valley residents.30 The panel then compiled 
the results of the study into publicly available reports on a “C8 Science Panel” 
website.31 Ultimately, the panel found a “Probable Link” between the ingestion 
of C8 via drinking water and six diseases.32 
As a part of the Leach Settlement, DuPont and the Leach Class agreed to 
conclusively accept the C8 Science Panel’s findings as showing general 
causation for those ailments with a “Probable Link” to C8 ingestion.33 
                                                                                                                     
 22 Id. § 1.49 (defining “Probable Link”); id. § 12.2.3. 
 23 The Science Panel, C8 SCI. PANEL, http://www.c8sciencepanel.org/panel.html 
[http://perma.cc/ZCH8-THF9].  
 24 Id. 
 25 Leach Settlement, supra note 13, §§ 9, 12.2.  
 26 See Rich, supra note 8; see also C8 Class Action Settlement, HILL, PETERSON, 
CARPER, BEE & DEITZLER, PLLC, http://www.hpcbd.com/Personal-Injury/DuPont-C8/C8-
Class-Action-Settlement.shtml [http://perma.cc/KM89-X3EW] (noting that HPCB&D is 
designated as one of three lead law firms in the C8 litigation along with Taft, Stettinius & 
Hollister and Winter & Johnson). The Leach Settlement required at least $20 million of the 
$70 million to be spent on the Community Health Study. Leach Settlement, supra note 13, 
§ 9.1.  
 27 The Science Panel, supra note 23. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. See generally Andrea Winquist et al., Design, Methods, and Population for a 
Study of PFOA Health Effects Among Highly Exposed Mid-Ohio Valley Community 
Residents and Workers, 121 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 893 (2013). 
 30 The Science Panel, supra note 23.  
 31 The Science Panel Website Home, supra note 10. 
 32 Id. (stating that the Science Panel found a “Probable Link” between ingestion of C8 
and diagnosed high cholesterol, ulcerative colitis, thyroid disease, testicular cancer, kidney 
cancer, and pregnancy-induced hypertension); see also Gray, supra note 20. 
 33 Leach Settlement, supra note 13, § 3.3.  
20 BARTLETT v. E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO. [2016 
Consequently, plaintiffs with kidney cancer, as well as five other diseases34 do 
not have to submit any evidence at trial, in terms of general causation, that C8 
was capable of causing their ailments.35 DuPont cannot refute this causal link 
between disease and C8 at trial.36 For the second facet of causation, specific 
causation, plaintiffs would have to show that it was “more likely than not” that 
C8 ingestion caused their individual cancer.37 
Therefore, in order for Mrs. Bartlett to demonstrate general and specific 
causation, Plaintiff’s counsel simply had to prove that Mrs. Bartlett drank 
Tupper’s Plains water for one year and that the water was contaminated at the 
“Probable Link” level38 and this—by differential diagnosis—was the most 
likely cause of her cancer.39 Importantly, in order for DuPont to combat 
causation, they needed to show that something other than C8 caused Mrs. 
Bartlett’s cancer.40 For Mrs. Bartlett, general causation was decided in her favor 
and proving that Mrs. Bartlett ingested water at the requisite level was likely a 
minor hurdle.41 
The Leach Settlement was a “unique procedure” to determine whether the 
80,000 members of the original Leach Class could file individual personal injury 
suits against DuPont for the various diseases they claimed C8 caused.42 
Reported to be the first biomonitoring agreement of its kind,43 the C8 Science 
                                                                                                                     
 34 See supra note 32. 
 35 Dispositive Motions Order No. 1-A at 5, In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. C-8 
Pers. Injury Litig., No. 2:13-MD-2433 (S.D. Ohio July 6, 2015), ECF No. 3972 [hereinafter 
MDL ECF No. 3972]. 
 36 See Leach Settlement, supra note 13, § 3.3 (“Defendant will not contest the issue of 
General Causation between C-8 and any Human Disease(s) as to which a Probable Link 
Finding has been delivered, but reserves the right to contest Specific Causation and 
damages.”). DuPont was not permitted to so much as point to the “limitations” of the C8 
Findings at trial. Dispositive Motions Order No. 1 at 8, In re DuPont, No. 2:13-MD-2433 
(Dec. 17, 2014), ECF No. 1679. 
 37 MDL ECF No. 3972, supra note 35, at 6–9. 
 38 Leach Settlement, supra note 13, § 2.1.1 (stating that “contaminated” water for 
purposes of the Leach Class contained “greater or equal to .05 ppb” of C8). 
 39 MDL ECF No. 3972, supra note 35, at 6–9. 
 40 Motions in Limine Order No. 2 at 1, 3–5, In re DuPont, No. 2:13-MD-2433 (Aug. 
31, 2015), ECF No. 4206.  
 41 See supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also Kyle Steenland et al., Predictors 
of PFOA Levels in a Community Surrounding a Chemical Plant, 117 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 
1083, 1085–88 (2009) (discussing levels of C8 in residents of affected water districts and 
concluding that “PFOA levels in this population varied with distance of residence from the 
plant and employment at the plant”). Mrs. Bartlett lived in the “Tuppers Plains-Chester water 
district in or about 1980 through the present” where residents had a median PFOA of 37.2 
nanograms per milliliter. Bartlett Complaint, supra note 5, at para 8; Steenland et al., supra, 
at 1084. In 2003–2004, the average U.S. citizen has 4 nanograms per milliliter. Steenland et 
al., supra, at 1083. 
 42 MDL ECF No. 3972, supra note 35, at 2. 
 43 Laura Hall et al., Litigating Toxic Risks Ahead of Regulation: Biomonitoring Science 
in the Courtroom, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 20 n.75 (2012); Jury Awards $1.6M, supra note 
7 (reporting that the C8 Science Panel is “one of the most extensive examinations ever of 
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Panel’s exposure and health studies were able to conclusively determine general 
causation by assessing the links between C8 and any human disease.44 In 
Bartlett, however, even with general causation decided, consideration and 
adjudication of issues of specific causation, negligence, damages and actual 
malice still lasted three weeks.45 Now that the first DuPont trial has come to a 
close46 a question of efficacy remains: based on a normative understanding of 
the role of juries in preserving “fairness” is the C8 Science Panel a more 
effective way to adjudicate a complicated scientific question, and ultimately 
does alternative scientific adjudication better preserve or threaten that fairness? 
This Comment addresses these issues below. 
III. A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR “FAIRNESS” IN ALTERNATIVE 
ADJUDICATION AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE C8 SCIENCE PANEL 
Trial by jury is a critical part of both civil and criminal adjudication.47 The 
role of the jury in trial is to be a neutral, objective, and unbiased decision-
maker.48 In essence, the jury’s role is to preserve “fairness.”49 Principles of due 
                                                                                                                     
how a toxic chemical affects humans”). 
 44 C8 Study Publications, C8 SCI. PANEL, http://www.c8sciencepanel.org/ 
publications.html [https://perma.cc/ZD2R-SK2E] (listing links to published studies). 
 45 See Jessica Dye & Kathy Lynn Gray, DuPont Found Liable in First Trial Over 
Teflon-Making Chemical C-8, REUTERS (Oct 7, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
du-pont-c8-verdict-idUSKCN0S12KE20151007 [https://perma.cc/R2C7-Q36P].  
 46 Judgment in a Civil Case, Bartlett v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 2:13-CV-
0170 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 8, 2015), ECF No. 144, 2015 WL 7075769. As of publication, the next 
trial in the C8 personal injury litigation is set for March 21, 2016. See Case Management 
Order No. 12, In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. C-8 Pers. Injury Litig., No. 2:13-MD-
2433 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 21, 2015), ECF No. 4250 (setting the jury trial date for the second case 
in the MDL: Wolf v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 2:14-CV-095 (S.D. Ohio filed Jan. 
7, 2014)). Subsequent trials have also been set every three months following Wolf v. DuPont. 
See Case Management Order No. 13, In re DuPont, No. 2:13-MD-2433 (Nov. 24, 2015), 
ECF No. 4263 (setting the jury trial date for the third case in the MDL: Freeman v. E. I. du 
Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 2:13-CV-1103 (S.D. Ohio filed Oct. 22, 2013)); Case 
Management Order No. 14, In re DuPont, No. 2:13-MD-2433 (Dec. 3, 2015), ECF No. 4268 
(setting the jury trial date for the fourth case in the MDL: Dowdy v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours 
& Co., No. 2:14-CV-185 (S.D. Ohio filed Jan. 27, 2014)). 
 47 See generally GERTNER & MIZNER, supra note 2, at 2–14. 
 48 See ERIC T. KASPER, IMPARTIAL JUSTICE: THE REAL SUPREME COURT CASES THAT 
DEFINE THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A NEUTRAL AND DETACHED DECISIONMAKER 12–16 
(2013). The jury is tasked with evaluating the evidence before them, applying legal 
standards, and determining whether plaintiff or defendant has carried their burden on proof 
such that one party, or the other, should prevail. MARGARET BULL KOVERA & BRIAN L. 
CUTLER, JURY SELECTION 3 (2013). 
 49 See KASPER, supra note 48, at 11 (“The best written laws are nothing without a fair 
and impartial application and procedural fairness.”); see also Molly Armour, Dazed and 
Confused: The Need for a Legislative Solution to the Constitutional Problem of Juror 
Incomprehension, 17 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 641, 642 (2008) (discussing the need to 
reform juries in order to preserve fairness and due process); Scott W. Howe, Juror Neutrality 
22 BARTLETT v. E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO. [2016 
process demand a neutral arbiter, thus it is appropriate to categorize the 
“fairness” preserved by a jury to reflect due process concerns.50 Before 
evaluating whether the C8 Science Panel is a better method of preserving jury 
fairness, it is important to outline what normative factors advance a jury’s ability 
to preserve fairness, and what factors limit that ability. 
Several factors advance a jury’s ability to preserve fairness. Most 
importantly, the jury is objective, unbiased, and neutral because members are 
not involved in the case or affected by its outcome.51 The random selection 
process for generating jury pools also advances this general neutrality.52 
Another important feature of juries is that they reflect community standards of 
fairness.53 What is legally appropriate behavior is often determined by standards 
of the community,54 and having a cross-section of the community decide cases 
ensures community standards are applied. Additionally, jurors make measured, 
non-arbitrary decisions because there must be consensus among jurors to render 
verdict.55 This non-arbitrariness principle of juries is further preserved through 
consensus because it ensures deliberation and thoughtful discussion.56 Finally, 
juries as a piece of the adjudicative process are subject to appellate and judicial 
redress.57 A judge may set aside a verdict for insufficient evidence or an 
appellate court may make other reversible determinations.58 This ability for 
                                                                                                                     
or an Impartiality Array? A Structural Theory of the Impartial Jury Mandate, 70 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1173, 1177 (1995) (“The Court has stated and implied in its decisions that 
due process requires a jury, whenever it is provided, to stand impartial in every sense in 
which the Sixth Amendment mandates impartiality.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 50 See KASPER, supra note 48, at 11. 
 51 “No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would 
certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 
10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 52 KOVERA & CUTLER, supra note 48, at 5. 
 53 Jeffrey Abramson, Jury Deliberation: Fair and Foul, in JURY ETHICS 181, 181 (John 
Kleinig & James P. Levine eds., 2006) (“Deliberation on a cross-sectional jury ideally serves 
the truth by drawing on the diverse experiences and views linked to demography in America, 
pushing all to consider how the evidence looks to those with different backgrounds.”).  
 54 See MORRIS B. HOFFMAN, THE PUNISHER’S BRAIN: THE EVOLUTION OF JUDGE AND 
JURY 3 (2014) (discussing the fact that a jury’s judgment is a “community judgment”).  
 55 GERTNER & MIZNER, supra note 2, at 243–46. The Sixth Amendment has been 
interpreted Federal criminal trials require unanimity, which may not be waived. Id. at 243. 
Unless stipulated otherwise by the parties, federal civil trials must also have unanimous 
verdicts. FED. R. CIV. P. 48(b).  
 56 See Abramson, supra note 53, at 181–99 (discussing the tactics and issues regarding 
different types of jury deliberations in the pursuit of unanimity).  
 57 See FED. R. CIV. P. 50, 52(a)(6); FED. R. APP. P. 4(a); CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY 
NULLIFICATION 7 (Cato Inst. 2014) (1998) (“The decisions of civil juries are not final; a 
judge may decide to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (non obstante veredicto, 
or simply ‘N.O.V.’), or to grant a ‘remittiture,’ effectively reducing the size of the jury’s 
award.”); ANN E. WOODLEY, LITIGATING IN FEDERAL COURT: A GUIDE TO THE RULES 103–
05 (2d ed. 2014)  
 58 See supra note 57. 
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redress acts as a safeguard, further ensuring non-arbitrary decisions.59 Taken as 
a whole, the jury is specially poised to advance fairness because it is designed 
to be unbiased, objective, neutral, reflect community standards of fairness, 
provide appellate redress, and be non-arbitrary. 
Several factors, however, limit a jury’s ability to preserve fairness. First, 
jurors may not understand the subject of litigation, even those that are highly 
educated.60 Similarly, jurors—as laypeople—are not well versed in the law.61 
Moreover, there is the possibility that the processes of jury selection and voir 
dire itself skew the diversity of viewpoints available on the jury.62 In particular, 
attorneys on either side in jury selection are attempting to strike jurors who are 
overly sympathetic to the opposing side.63 This creates a possibility that instead 
of representing community views through random selection, a jury could 
actually be skewed by the lawyers themselves.64 This risk is slight, however, 
given that both sides are able to strike jurors.65 More problematic than the ability 
to strike jurors is the pool of people available for jury service.66 The pool of 
people available may be incomplete, and therefore skewed, given the varied and 
imperfect sources of names from which jury pools are drawn.67 In addition, 
juries render verdicts in secret, meaning the ultimate facts upon which a decision 
                                                                                                                     
 59 See supra note 57. 
 60 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157 (1968) (“[A]t the heart of the dispute 
have been express or implicit assertions that juries are incapable of adequately understanding 
evidence or determining issues of fact, and that they are unpredictable, quixotic, and little 
better than a roll of dice.”). Highly educated jurors in general are more likely to be excused 
for inability to sit the length of trial. Further, there is a suggestion that the ability to be fair 
is correlated with higher education. KOVERA & CUTLER, supra note 48, at 211. 
 61 See Armour, supra note 49, at 641–42 (discussing the problem of juror 
incomprehension regarding legal standards). 
 62 KOVERA & CUTLER, supra note 48, at 3 (suggesting that the outcome of a trial can 
depend on the selection of the jury); see also LAURA I APPLEMAN, DEFENDING THE JURY 5 
(2015) (discussing the justice system’s “ongoing failure to integrate the community’s voice” 
in the jury box). Further, states vary in the lists used to generate jury pools. See, e.g., Jury 
Selection and Pay, GREENVILLE COUNTY CLERK OF COURT, 
http://www.greenvillecounty.org/Clerk_Of_Court/Jury_Duty/selection_process.asp 
[https://perma.cc/5L6E-S46W] (“Jurors are selected from a list made up of all registered 
voters, licensed drivers, and holders of state-issued photo I.D. cards.”); Jury Duty, POLK 
COUNTY CLERK OF COURTS, http://www.polkcountyclerk.net/jury-duty/ [https://perma.cc/ 
B5XV-A5JC] (“Names are randomly selected from the list of names supplied by the 
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles.”). 
 63 KOVERA & CUTLER, supra note 48, at 14. 
 64 In criminal cases, issues with selection bias in regards to race and sex have created 
requirements that gender and race may not be the impetus for striking a juror. See Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535–36 (1975).  
 65 KOVERA & CUTLER, supra note 48, at 13–14. 
 66 See supra note 62. 
 67 See KOVERA & CUTLER, supra note 48, at 6 (“They may use lists of voter registrants, 
driver’s license holders, taxpayers, utilities customers, and recipients of unemployment 
benefits . . . .”); supra note 62. 
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is made remain unknown.68 The secrecy factor makes it difficult for judges and 
parties to evaluate and monitor the actual methods of decision-making a jury 
uses in deliberation.69 Finally, the length and procedure of trial itself can cause 
wavering attention spans and perhaps even inattentiveness to all facts—a 
fallibility of human nature.70 In sum, juries are limited in their ability to preserve 
fairness because they lack technical knowledge, have an imperfect attention 
span, lack familiarity with legal standards, are somewhat viewpoint selected, 
and render verdicts in a secret decision making process. 
As examined in Part IV below, when evaluated against this framework for 
jury fairness, the C8 Science Panel used in Bartlett is relatively effective at 
preserving fairness and may improve upon the jury process by compensating for 
some of the jury’s limitations in dealing with complex scientific questions. 
IV. THE EFFICACY OF THE C8 SCIENCE PANEL AS SEEN THROUGH A 
NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK OF JURY “FAIRNESS” 
A. Factors that Advance the C8 Science Panel’s Ability to Preserve 
Fairness 
Evaluated within the normative framework described in Part III, the C8 
Science Panel as used in Bartlett was generally able to preserve traditional jury 
fairness and improve upon some jury limitations when evaluating complex 
scientific questions. First, the selection of the C8 Science Panel replicated the 
traditional process for selecting a neutral, objective, and unbiased jury. The 
Panel was fairly chosen because the scientists were “mutually” agreed upon.71 
This mutual agreement emulates voir dire where attorneys try to strike jurors 
most aligned with the other side.72 Further, the mutual agreement provision for 
                                                                                                                     
 68 See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933) (Cardozo, J.) (“Freedom of debate 
might be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors were made to feel that their 
arguments and ballots were to be freely published to the world.”). 
 69 See Torrence Lewis, Toward a Limited Right of Access to Jury Deliberations, 58 
FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 196 (2006) (arguing for an improvement in the jury system through 
limited disclosure of jury deliberations); Clifford Holt Ruprecht, Comment, Are Verdicts, 
Too, Like Sausages?: Lifting the Cloak of Jury Secrecy, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 218 (1997) 
(arguing that jury deliberations should be overseen by other government actors). 
 70 The many guides to attracting and keeping a juror’s attention illustrate this point. See, 
e.g., TREY COX, WINNING THE JURY’S ATTENTION 3–4 (2011). Additionally, one study of 
civil trials by the Federal Judicial Center found that the ability to understand evidence 
presented was decreased in a long trial as compared to a short trial. JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., JURY SERVICE IN LENGTHY CIVIL TRIALS 27–28 (1987), 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/jurylnth.pdf/$file/jurylnth.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
XAA2-8QES]. Further, when participants were asked “How often did you find your attention 
wandering during the presentation of the evidence?”, 40% of jurors in long trials responded 
“occasionally” compared to only 24% of jurors in short trials. Id. at 28. 
 71 Leach Settlement, supra note 13, § 12.2.1.  
 72 See supra Part II.  
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selecting the C8 Science Panel may help to combat the viewpoint selection 
issues of a jury because unlike voir dire the attorneys were required to agree—
meaning the most neutral scientists likely comprised the panel.73 Additionally, 
unlike persons who comprise jury pools,74 the pool of scientists available was 
arguably limitless.75 Finally, the C8 Science Panel was paid for by the Leach 
Settlement independent of the results of the community health study.76 While 
the fact that DuPont paid for the C8 Science Panel in its entirety may seem to 
cut against the Panel’s “fairness”—because DuPont paid the Panel regardless of 
the Panel’s decision77 helps to combat any fear that DuPont was “buying” a 
favorable result. 
In addition to the member selection process, there are some unique features 
of the C8 Science Panel that may advance fairness even more so than a 
traditional jury. Most obviously, during trial, the Panel simplified the Jury’s 
technical role by providing an undisputed fact that C8 is generally capable of 
causing kidney cancer.78 The Panel’s technical knowledge analyzed the 
causation element using accepted scientific methods that would otherwise have 
posed potentially impenetrable questions for a jury (or even a judge) to 
understand.79 In particular, the C8 Science Panel studied C8 and its effects of 
humans, over a period of years80—as opposed to weeks.81 This subject-matter 
                                                                                                                     
 73 See Leach Settlement, supra note 13, § 12.2.1 (“Appropriate candidates for 
appointment to the Science Panel shall be recognized, independent, appropriately 
credentialed epidemiologists who have not testified as expert witnesses designated by the 
Settling Parties, and who have not been consulted by counsel for the Settling Parties prior to 
September 4, 2004, unless waived by mutual agreement of the Settling Parties.”).  
 74 See supra note 62. 
 75 So long as they met the minimum requirements of qualification as set by the Leach 
Settlement. See supra note 73. 
 76 See Leach Settlement, supra note 13, § 12.2.1. The Leach Settlement required, 
regardless of result, that at least $20 million be spent on the C8 Science Panel and the 
Community Health Study. Id. § 9.1. 
 77 See supra note 76.  
 78 See supra Part II.  
 79 See Bruce J. Berger, The Trouble with PFOA: Testing, Regulation and Science 
Concerning Perfluorooctanoic Acid and Implications for Future Litigation, 76 DEF. COUNS. 
J. 460, 469 (2009) (discussing the difficulties of proving PFOA personal injury suits unless 
deleterious health effects in humans is directly linked to levels of PFOA in the environment); 
supra Part II. 
 80 The Science Panel Website Home, supra note 10 (from 2005–2013). 
 81 In another adjudicative setting, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the WTO’s 
international dispute resolution body is able to effectuate quicker scientific “turn-around” 
than the C8 Science Panel in this case. The quick turn around is likely due to the fact that 
instead of a ground-up study, the WTO Panel relied, more like a court, on preliminary 
information provided by the parties. See generally Dale E. McNiel, The First Case Under 
the WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement: The European Union’s Hormone Ban, 
39 VA. J. INT’L L. 89, 111–12 (1998). This accelerated timing is a consideration for actions 
that may require a quicker turn around. See generally id. 
26 BARTLETT v. E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO. [2016 
simplification combats a jury’s lack of technical knowledge—a crucial factor in 
advancing fairness in complex scientific litigation.82 
Additionally, the Panel’s determination of general causation shortened the 
time frame of trial, combating the imperfect attention spans of jurors.83 Mrs. 
Bartlett’s three-week trial84 would have lasted significantly longer if the crux of 
her suit, general causation, were still up for debate.85 The Panel’s ability to 
shorten the trial time frame advances fairness because it keeps a jury engaged 
as opposed to wavering in attention after weeks of trial.86 
The non-arbitrariness principle of a traditional jury is advanced because a 
science panel will create more consistent outcomes for litigants. Juries are not 
necessarily consistent when faced with similar facts, even with the consensus 
requirement.87 The scientific results reached by the Panel, however, ensure that 
general causation is determined consistently among litigants in the C8 personal 
injury litigation.88 This also provides objective fairness to Defendant DuPont 
because juries may be swayed in their view of science because of a particularly 
sympathetic plaintiff,89 whereas a science panel evaluates only the science.90 
Uniquely, unlike the “secrecy” of jury deliberations,91 the Panel’s process 
for determining causation was incredibly transparent. The information was 
                                                                                                                     
 82 See supra Part III. 
 83 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
 84 Dye & Gray, supra note 45.  
 85 Furthermore, the use of the C8 Science Panel circumvented the complicated issues 
and limitations of class certification of toxic tort litigants. Berger, supra note 79, at 468.  
 86 See supra Part II and note 70. 
 87 See supra note 62. 
 88 There are 3500 individual suits stemming from the Leach Settlement. Multidistrict 
Litigation 2433: Introduction, U.S. DISTRICT CT. SOUTHERN DISTRICT OHIO, 
http://www.ohsd.uscourts.gov/MDLINTRO [https://perma.cc/J8LH-KNNH]. While the 
Leach Settlement was a class action settlement, the C8 Personal Injury litigation consists of 
individual suits of persons formerly in the Leach Class. See supra Part II.  
 89 See Neal R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analysis, 
65 TENN. L. REV. 1, 19–26 (1997) (discussing the extent and process of sympathetic decision 
making by juries). Courts do not allow attorneys to ask jurors to rely on sympathy by 
theoretically placing themselves in the plaintiff’s shoes. See, e.g., Marcoux v. Farm Serv. & 
Supplies, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d 457, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The well established ‘Golden 
Rule,’ also known as the ‘bag of gold’ rule, prohibits counsel from tell[ing] the jurors, either 
directly or by implication, that they should put themselves in plaintiff’s place and render 
such a verdict as they would wish to receive were they in plaintiff’s position.” (alteration in 
original)). 
 90 The panel’s findings were able to provide objective fairness in West Virginia, 
considered a plaintiff friendly state with unique litigation choices, including a controversial 
“medical monitoring” tort. See Patrick J. Borchers, Punitive Damages, Forum Shopping, and 
the Conflict of Laws, 70 LA. L. REV. 529, 537 (2010) (“According to the 2007 Chamber of 
Commerce study, the five ‘worst’—i.e., presumably most plaintiff-friendly—states are West 
Virginia, Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, and Illinois.”); Adam P. Joffe, The Medical 
Monitoring Remedy: Ongoing Controversy and a Proposed Solution, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
663, 674 (2009). 
 91 See supra Part III. 
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made publicly available on a special “C8 Science Panel” website.”92 This 
transparency enforces the “community standards” of scientific accuracy and 
even more importantly ensures the non-arbitrariness principle. 
Overall, the C8 Science Panel is able to better preserve fairness in evaluating 
technical science, combating human attention spans, creating a consistent result 
among litigants, and providing a transparent decision making process. 
Additionally, the C8 Science Panel is at least as good, if not better, than a 
traditional jury in preserving an objective, neutral, and detached arbiter. 
B. Limitations of the C8 Science Panel’s Ability to Preserve Fairness 
The C8 Science Panel’s ability to preserve fairness is limited in a few ways. 
First, the novel nature of the Panel’s findings could be criticized for lacking the 
type of scientific peer review that typically accompanies scientific research.93 
Therefore, the formulation of results is not necessarily reflective of accepted 
scientific community standards.94 Similarly, there is a risk that current 
limitations in scientific methodology limit the efficacy of the Panel in its ability 
to render a scientific decision regarding any particular disease. While hard 
science may sometimes be inconclusive, a jury reflects a more malleable 
community standard of reasonability—thus juries may be able to make 
inferential leaps where a properly grounded science panel cannot.95 This 
limitation in inference, however, is balanced by the non-arbitrariness principle 
discussed above.96A scientific determination—which arguably should have 
only one correct answer97—that is consistent for purposes of large scale 
scientific litigation is more reflective of the “consensus” a jury must reach. Any 
inferential step a jury may make is likely not worth the loss of credibility the 
judicial system would suffer as a result of inconsistent causation outcomes. 
Additionally, the C8 Science Panel does not improve upon a traditional 
jury’s unfamiliarity with substantive law.98 Scientists, while highly educated, 
                                                                                                                     
 92 The Science Panel Website Home, supra note 10. Piggybacking from transparency, 
the panel’s findings could be transferred to governmental agencies, like the EPA. This helps 
expand the marketplace of knowledge for regulation of companies and preservation and 
cleanup of environments. 
 93 Berger, supra note 79, at 465–66. 
 94 See id.; supra Part III (discussing that community standards ensure fairness).  
 95 Hall et al., supra note 43, at 4–7. 
 96 See supra Part III. 
 97 For example, general causation is theoretically always the same regarding 
consumption of C8 and kidney cancer, but, without independent evaluation of this face a two 
separate juries may not find general causation in two C8 personal injury cases regarding 
kidney cancer. See supra note 62. 
 98 Additionally, there is an issue with charging a science panel to come to a legal 
conclusion where the legal standard for causation (or another element) may not be consistent 
among states. See MDL ECF No. 3972, supra note 35, at 14–15. For example, in Bartlett, 
Defendant attempted to attack the binding nature of the C8 Science Panel findings because 
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cannot be said to be generally familiar with legal standards of adjudication. This 
unfamiliarity, however, may not be a bad attribute. While a jury is limited by its 
lack of legal knowledge, that may be by design. A wealth of legal knowledge 
may limit the ability of a jury to listen to the facts before it and render an 
objective verdict. Similarly, a science panel that is well versed in legal standards 
of causation may not be able to put that out of their minds while assessing the 
scientific evidence before it.99 
Another possible limitation of the C8 Science Panel is the lack of appellate 
redress. Whether the “No Probable Link” plaintiffs were given sufficient 
process is indeterminate. By terms of the Leach Settlement, those litigants with 
“No Probable Link” diseases" are forever barred from suit.100 While, taking the 
decision away from the jury is certainly more efficient for parties to the actual 
lawsuit, for the “No Probable Link” plaintiffs, there is no appellate structure for 
redress.101 While DuPont reserved the right to contest specific causation and 
damages, there is no ability preserved by the parties to appeal the C8 Science 
Panel’s factual findings regarding general causation.102 The C8 Science Panel 
only found six out of many illnesses studied to have a probable link to C8 
exposure.103 The inability of the “No Probable Link” plaintiffs to appeal the C8 
Science Panel findings is a serious limitation of the C8 Science Panel’s ability 
to advance fairness in adjudication. Importantly, though, the class of plaintiffs 
agreed to this result—plaintiffs knew that if the C8 Science Panel did not find a 
“Probable Link” there would be no ability to file suit. 
Therefore a jury is limited by its potential lack of accepted community 
standards in achieving scientific results, possible limitations in the current 
ability of science determine a result, the Panel’s unfamiliarity with legal 
standards, and lack of appellate redress for certain plaintiffs. 
C. Summary: Determining What Is Most “Fair” for Complex Scientific 
Litigation 
Ultimately, what is most “fair” in determining causation for complex 
scientific litigation remains to be seen. The C8 Science Panel in Bartlett, though, 
is a good example of preserving traditional jury fairness.104 Within the 
normative framework,105 the most significant limitation of the C8 Science Panel 
                                                                                                                     
the Ohio Standard for general causation in toxic torts is worded slightly differently than the 
standard for causation used by the C8 Science Panel. Id. 
 99 See supra Part III. There is always the chance that a legally educated science panel 
would research and conclude results with legal, as opposed to scientific, standards in mind. 
See supra Part III. 
 100 See supra note 19.  
 101 See supra note 19. 
 102 See supra note 19. 
 103 See supra note 32. See generally C8 Study Publications, supra note 44 (listing 
numerous links to human disease studies and the design of the C8 community health study). 
 104 See supra Part IV.A.  
 105 See supra Part III. 
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is the lack of appellate redress for “No Probable Link” plaintiffs. This bar on 
appealing the Panel’s factual findings, however, may be worth the many positive 
and unique fairness advantages the C8 Science Panel achieved. Unlike a jury, 
the Panel was able to use scientific expertise to parse through the impenetrable 
science involved in the C8 litigation and deliver an objective, neutral, and non-
arbitrary result to an entire class of personal injury plaintiffs. 
V. THE FUTURE OF COMPLEX SCIENTIFIC ADJUDICATION & POLICY 
PERSPECTIVES IN PRESERVING “FAIRNESS” IN LITIGATION 
The courtroom is no stranger to complicated toxic tort litigation.106 By its 
nature, however, a jury does not have sophisticated scientific knowledge, which 
in complicated scientific litigation threatens a jury’s normative role in 
preserving fairness. In Bartlett, the C8 Science Panel’s general causation 
findings allowed the jury to get past the complex science and decide the factual 
questions that ascribed legal responsibility to DuPont. Moving beyond Bartlett, 
though, it is important to also consider whether use of a science panel properly 
preserves due process. 
The “fairness” embodied by a jury itself reflects due process107, therefore it 
is important to consider the theoretical issues with to taking a necessary element 
of a given claim—here, general causation—away from the jury. The 
constitutional right to due process has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to 
protect the right to an impartial jury in criminal and civil cases.108 What it means 
to have an impartial jury, however, is not so easily defined. There are plenty of 
avenues where legal questions are decided that do not involve a jury.109 For 
instance, it is established practice for parties to segment litigation,110 or stipulate 
to a variety of facts before trial.111 Many trials are only on damages after parties 
have stipulated to generally liability.112 Further, when it comes to complex 
                                                                                                                     
 106 See generally Neal Ellis Jr., Introduction, in TOXIC TORT LITIGATION 1–14 (D. Alan 
Rudlin ed., 2007). 
 107 See supra Part II. 
 108 KASPER, supra note 48, at 6. In the Leach Settlement, parties waived a right to a jury 
trial on the issue of general causation by agreeing to a bar on suits regarding “No Probable 
Link” plaintiffs as well as an agreement by Defendant DuPont not to “contest the issue of 
General Causation.” Leach Settlement, supra note 13, § 3.3; Bartlett Complaint, supra note 
5, at paras. 142–43. 
 109 WOODLEY, supra note 57, at 77–79; see also Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining alternative dispute resolution as “[a]ny 
procedure for settling a dispute by means other than litigation, as by arbitration or 
mediation”). 
 110 See Derek A. Shoemake, Bifurcation: A Powerful but Underutilized Tool in South 
Carolina Civil Litigation, 59 S.C. L. REV. 433 (2008); ELI’s Gulf Team, supra note 2 
(discussing the segmented Deepwater Horizon litigation). 
 111 Misty C. Duke et al., The Effect of Liability on Damage Awards in a Personal Injury 
Case, 21 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 265, 265 (2015). 
 112 See id. 
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scientific questions, a jury may even be more impartial where excessively 
complicated scientific questions are decided by those with technical training and 
traditional legal issues remain with the jury.113 
Moving beyond due process concerns with taking legal questions away from 
a jury, there is a question of whether it is appropriate—as a matter of public 
policy—to contract around a jury decision. Here, DuPont arguably traded its 
“burden” of defending the general causation element for each C8 lawsuit in 
exchange for defending fewer lawsuits.114 Here, one of the biggest hurdles in 
toxic tort litigation—general causation—was already decided in favor of any 
“Probable Link” plaintiff.115 The C8 Science Panel’s findings, in effect, created 
an irrebuttable presumption of causation in favor of any defendant who suffered 
from one of the six “Probable Link” diseases.116 Those plaintiffs have a reduced 
litigation burden by virtue of having general causation pre-determined, but as 
the Leach Settlement mandates Plaintiffs whose disease did not have a probable 
link are forever barred from suit against DuPont.117 Thus, DuPont is certain that 
it will only have to defend suits regarding those six “Probable Link” diseases 
and no more. In a sense of fairness and policy, this factor is unclear. But, it is 
certainly a method of adjudication worth considering for Defendants. At a 
minimum, DuPont may plan its litigation strategy more concretely and 
“Probable Link” plaintiffs may file suit knowing they have a higher likelihood 
of success.118 
Despite any theoretical or policy issues with segmenting toxic tort litigation, 
the C8 Science Panel in Bartlett, was able to replicate traditional fairness-
preserving attributes normally employed by a jury. In order to improve upon the 
Bartlett C8 Science Panel, future panels of this sort may consider a method of 
“scientific review” in order to combat any fairness issues with the C8 Science 
Panel’s lack of appellate review. 
Litigation over the consequences of chemical risks is not going to abate. 
Global chemical production is predicted to grow and keep growing.119 Use of 
alternative methods of adjudicating scientific questions is one way to manage 
this trend and retain the fairness of traditional jury resolution. The C8 Science 
Panel is one such method of alternative adjudication litigants should consider. 
                                                                                                                     
 113 See supra Part IV. 
 114 See supra Part II.  
 115 See Ellis, supra note 106, at 4; supra Part II. 
 116 See Leach Settlement, supra note 13, § 3.3; supra Part II. 
 117 Leach Settlement, supra note 13, §§ 3.2–.3. 
 118 Id. § 4.1 (“Defendant states that it is entering into this Settlement to avoid the time, 
expense and distraction of embroilment in the current Lawsuit and potential future litigation 
and disputes relating to present, past or future C-8 exposure claimed to be attributable to the 
operations of Washington Works.”).  
 119 Hall et al., supra note 43, at 4; see also Matthew Kelly, Toxic Truth: $1.6M Court 
Win for Cancer Victim Exposed to Same Chemical in RAAF Base Leak, NEWCASTLE HERALD 
(Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.theherald.com.au/story/3420585/payout-for-cancer-victim-
exposed-to-leaked-chemicals/ [https://perma.cc/2X8D-JZXA] (reporting that the US case of 
Bartlett v. DuPont could have a major impact on Australian toxic tort litigation). 
